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Tom Mouck
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

THE IRONY OF "THE GOLDEN AGE"
OF ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY
Abstract: Developments in accounting methodology during the
1960s are contrasted with concurrent developments in philosophy
of science. The 1960s was a decade characterized by the widespread
adoption of "the scientific method" in accounting methodology.
The same decade was characterized by the degeneration of any
semblance of consensus among philosophers of science regarding
the nature of scientific inquiry. The irony of these incongruous but
simultaneous developments is highlighted with the intent of
weakening the current atmosphere of uncritical reverence for
science and "the scientific method" in accounting research. A more
contemporary (and more open) view of science — the postempiricist view — also is discussed.

Ruth Hines recently has expressed concern about dogmatic
tendencies in accounting research; tendencies which are linked
to "an unwarranted reverence for science and 'the scientific
method' " [1988, pp. 660-61]. Reverence for "the scientific
method" can be traced to developments in the 1960s — the
decade that has been dubbed "The Golden Age" of accounting
methodology [Graffikin, 1988]. The 1960s also has been referred
to as the "Decade of Awakening" [Dyckman and Zeff, 1984, p.
233] — the decade during which accounting researchers awoke
to the scientific method. This is highly ironic because the 1960s
was the decade that saw the deterioration of any semblance of
consensus among philosophers of science. Just as accounting
r e s e a r c h e r s w e r e d i s c o v e r i n g "the s c i e n t i f i c m e t h o d "
philosophers of science were witnessing its disintegration. The
aim of this article is to undermine the atmosphere of dogmatism
noted by Hines by highlighting the irony of the Golden Age of
accounting methodology and calling attention to a more contemporary (more open) view of science that has been referred to
as the postempiricist view.
THE 1960s: A DECADE OF AWAKENING
FOR ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY
There is no question that the 1960s represent a watershed in
accounting research. Gaffikin [1987] has argued that, with few
Published by eGrove, 1989

1

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 16 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 3
86

The Accounting

Historians

Journal,

December

1989

exceptions, pre-1960 accounting research was philosophically
and methodologically unsophisticated. Researchers provided
descriptive catalogues of existing practices and attempted to
uncover rules for improving accounting practices.
Post-1960s accounting research is a radically different story.
The mainstream journals reflect an increasing obsession with
empirical research that is presumed to be in accordance with
the principles of scientific inquiry. The journals are loaded with
m a t h e m a t i c a l model-building, hypotheses testing, esoteric
statistical techniques, and so forth. And even though the articles
reflect considerable theoretical diversity, they suggest widespread agreement regarding scientific methodology. In fact,
Chua [1986] has argued that
. . . accounting research has been guided by a dominant . . . set of assumptions. There has been one general scientific world-view, one primary discipline
matrix. And accounting researchers, as a community
of scientists, have shared and continue to share a
constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques. These
beliefs c i r c u m s c r i b e definitions of " w o r t h w h i l e
problems" and "acceptable scientific evidence." [p.
602]
The "scientific" world-view of mainstream accounting researchers, according to Chua, is grounded in a belief that
"reality" exists independently of the h u m a n subject. Theories,
in the mainstream view, "are put forward as attempts to
discover a knowable, objective reality" [Chua, 1986, p. 606]. And
since objective reality is taken to be separate from theoretical
constructs, "Accounting researchers believe in the empirical
testability of scientific theories" [Chua, 1986, p. 607].
This dominant "scientific" world-view has its roots in the
literature of the 1960s. These roots have recently been traced by
Gaffikin in his 1988 article, "Legacy of the Golden Age". He
argues that, "despite the different research methods employed,
because the ontological and epistemological presuppositions are
the same, the methodological underpinnings have remained
fairly constant" [1988, p. 16]. And he maintains that these
methodological underpinnings are primarily due to the influence of four researchers — Chambers, Mattessich, Devine and
Sterling.
These writers were well versed in philosophy of science and
were anxious to extend the scientific method to accounting
thought. Chambers, for instance, writes in a "Working Paper"
for The Academy of Accounting Historians:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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By 1954 I believed it necessary, at least for myself, to
set down the way in which a theory of accounting
should be developed. In none of the important works
on accounting was there a treatment of methodology.
There was no pattern to follow except that of the
well-developed sciences. And writers on accounting
were following no pattern. My principal formal
guides were Cohen and Nagel's An Introduction
to
Logic and Scientific
Method, L a r r a b e e ' s Reliable
Knowledge and Robbins' The Nature and Significance
of Economic Science. . . .I wrote "Blueprint for a
Theory of Accounting" in 1955 and two other pieces
shortly afterward in response to some criticism. I
returned to the matter in the early sixties because no
material change had occurred in the way in which
accountants dealt with the construction and validation of their ideas [p. 8].
Devine emphasizes, "that measurement is a process that
requires extremely high levels of abstraction" [1966, p. 14]. And
he references Milton Friedman's "Essay on the Methodology of
Positive Economics" in his discussion of the appraisal of
abstractions. "The prospects for appraising such abstractions by
the 'realism' of their components instead of by the relationship
of their output to goals and need is dim indeed (See Friedman
[7])" [Devine, 1966, p. 14]. This is apparently a reference to
Friedman's notorious claim about the irrelevance of the realism
of assumptions and his emphasis on predictive capability. In the
same article Devine claims that, "The common core of scientific
methods is the interworking of observation and deduction, and
it should be clear that one can construct a predictive social
theory only in conjunction with empirical and behavioral assumptions" [p. 26].
Mattessich, in his 1964 book Accounting and Analytical
Methods, criticizes the current state of both accounting theory
and accounting pedagogy. "Accounting theory," he says, "has
developed a body of knowledge which is of a dogmatic rather
than scientific-hypothetical character and which serves with
satisfaction only purposes of a legalistic n a t u r e " [p. 4]. And he
chastises academic accounting for its over-emphasis on technical aspects of existing practice. "It leaves the student at a loss
when it comes to expressing accounting theory in terms of
modern logic, epistemology, and quantitative analysis" [Mattessich, p. 4]. "The accountant's dilemma," Mattessich suggests,
"is not merely a problem of memorizing some formulas or
learning new mathematical tricks, it is a problem of transition
Published by eGrove, 1989
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f r o m the d o g m a t i c t h i n k i n g of the j u r i s p r u d e n t to the
behavioral-analytical thinking of the scientist" [p. x].
Finally, Gaffikin cites Sterling's Theory of the Measurement
of Enterprise Income as one of the m a j o r works of the decade,
noting that although it was not published until 1970 it was
written ten years previously and portions of it were reflected in
Sterling's other published works in the 1960s. Gaffikin also
notes that Sterling's views on accounting theory are very similar
to those of Chambers. Both Chambers and Sterling advocate the
adoption of accounting based on exit-prices because these are
empirically observable data.
Graffikin e m p h a s i z e s the methodological similarities
among Chambers, Devine, Mattessich and Sterling, but there
are also significant differences; most notably with respect to
Devine's pragmatic orientation. Compared with Sterling, for
instance, Devine is much more circumspect regarding the nature of facts, truth, and the potential for scientific accounting.
For Sterling, "Scientific knowledge is intended to refer to real
things in the real world" [1976, p. 83], and competing hypotheses are empirically tested to find out "which is most in
harmony with the facts of observation" [1976, p. 83]. An "empirical test," for Sterling, "simply means that one looks at real
things in the real world to find out what is true" [1976, p. 83].
Accordingly, he maintains that accounting is in need of a
redefinition: "we must define it [accounting] as a process of
keeping track of real things in the real world" [1976, p. 85]. His
candidate for an empirical base for accounting is, of course, ext
values — "they are useful to a great many decisions . . . [and]
they are subject to empirical test, we will be able to resolve
disputes about t h e m " [1976, p. 87].
Devine, on the other hand, maintains that "the facts of a
case are determined by objectives" [1985, Vol. V, p. 57]. And as
Arrington points out, "for Devine and the pragmatists, [truth is]
something that a community finds useful to believe, and useful
for definite assignable reasons that have to do with ways in
which problems can be solved and life can be changed" [p. 139].
Also, for Devine and the pragmatists, if seems doubtful that
science can find "any universal principles that are 'basic' to all
cultures for eternity" [1985, Vol. Ill, p. 14]. And it is understandable that Devine would seem to suggest, in the words of one
reviewer, "that it will not be possible to develop a global set of
accounting principles" [Anton, et. al., p. 413].
Neither is it possible, from Devine's perspective, for accountants (or even scientists) to eliminate values from their work:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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"everything of consequence done by accountants has ethical
content in the sense that their decisions help or h a r m various
individuals" [1985, Vol. V, p. 5]. And in response to Chambers'
claim that, "Our inquiry, like that of economics, 'is entirely
neutral between ends' . . . " [quoted by Devine, 1985, Vol. Ill, p.
391, Devine responds as follows: "Advocacy of neutrality is . . .
insidious. It is an offspring of the discredited doctrine of observing the (!) facts. . . . Facts are interpretations relevant to a
viewpoint" [1985, Vol. III, p. 40].
But regardless of differences, Chambers, Devine, Mattessich
and Sterling were major influences on the new directions taken
in accounting methodology and research. Their scientificallyoriented works on accounting theory, however, were not the
only influences that made the 1960s a watershed decade for
accounting research. As Whitley [1986 & 1988] has pointed out,
social, political and economic events as well as institutional
developments all played a role in transforming academic accounting research, and helped pave the way for the increasingly
dominant emphasis on quantitative ("scientific") accounting
research. Following the Soviet Union's successful launching of
Sputknik, the U.S. in the late fifties and early sixties was
pervaded by a sense of urgency to expand scientific and mathematical training. And following the successful employment of
scientific research and operations research methods in World
War II, there was widespread belief " t h a t 'science' could be
applied to managerial and business problems and scientific
research into these problems should be supported" [Whitley,
1986, p. 171]. More concisely, the Ford and Carnegie Foundations had both published reports in 1959 encouraging "an
expansion of 'scientific' research in U.S. business schools";
reports which were subsequently backed up by "substantial
grants and publishing opportunities" [Whitley, 1988, p. 641]. In
short, the stage was set for the emergence of a community of
accounting researchers who shared a commitment to empirical
("scientific") research.
Supportive technology also was available. The 1960s was a
decade of r a p i d l y e x p a n d i n g c o m p u t e r a v a i l a b i l i t y a n d
computer-generated data; developments which greatly extended the possibilities for statistical work. And other developments of the 1960s, most notably the emergence of the efficient
markets literature in economics and the capital asset pricing
model in finance, further accelerated the pace of empirical
research in accounting [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 236].
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On all fronts the 1960s was, in the words of Dyckman and
Zeff, "a pivotal decade" for accounting research [p. 236]: "In the
literature of accounting research, the 1960s was the Decade of
Awakening" [p. 233]. The American Accounting Association
initiated a series of Studies in Accounting Research. Stanford
University, the University of Chicago, and the University of
Kansas initiated conferences and symposia focusing on empirical research and methodology. And in 1966 the Journal of
Accounting Research began publishing "a series of annual Supplements that were devoted almost exclusively to the empirical
research papers presented at Chicago's Conference on Empirical
Research in Accounting" [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 269].
It is ironic, however, that accounting researchers were
awakening to the scientific method of inquiry just as events in
philosophy of science were raising doubts about the validity of
any exclusive approach to inquiry. In 1965, the same year that
saw "the first university-sponsored conference dedicated wholly
to accounting research" [Dyckman and Zeff, p. 234], an international symposium on philosophy of science was held in London
to explore the challenges presented by Thomas Kuhn's The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (originally published in 1962).
Papers presented by some of the worlds leading philosophers of
science were later published in a volume entitled Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge. Philosophy of science has not been the
same since. Indeed, as economic methodologist Douglas Hands
recently pointed out, philosophy of science "has undergone a
m a j o r upheaval during the last twenty years. The so-called
'received view' of the preceding epoch is dead" [Hands, 1984, p.
116].

THE 1960S: A DECADE OF TURMOIL
IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Modern Western society has tended toward the notion that
the only valid truth claims are those resulting from the scientific
process. And until the last twenty-five years or so, philosophers
of science considered it their duty to provide prescriptions for
scientific practice, and to provide philosophical explanations for
why the truth claims of science are epistemologically valid. The
following is a very brief sketch of the dominant view in pre1960s philosophy of science. Based on empirical observations,
scientists formulate general laws via a process of induction. The
general laws must satisfy both logical and empirical conditions
of adequacy. They must be logically necessary for deduction of
the initially observed data, and they must be capable of empirihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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cal testing. The adequacy (or truth) of such laws is judged on the
basis of their ability to predict the phenomena under consideration.
Sir Karl Popper, in his classic work, The Logic of Scientific
Discovery (originally published in 1934), rejected this view of
scientific method because of its reliance on induction. A logical
deduction is complete in and of itself. An inductive inference,
however, can never be complete in and of itself because it has to
be based on limited experience and future experience may (in a
logical sense) contradict any inductive inference. It is thus
impossible to conclusively prove the truth of any theory. Popper
therefore turned to falsification as a basis for philosophy of
science with the idea that, if theories are repeatedly subjected to
attempts at falsification, then scientific knowledge can, at least,
grow ever closer to the truth as false theories are rejected.
Popper's falsificationism has been very influential in that it
is often cited as the legitimate basis for scientific methodology.
Unfortunately Popper also has been widely misunderstood.
Naive empiricists (including mainstream accounting researchers) have assumed Popper to be arguing as follows: whereas no
amount of confirmatory empirical evidence can conclusively
prove the truth of a theory, it can be conclusively disproven by
contradictory empirical evidence. But Popper expressly denied
any such claim. "In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a
theory can ever be produced. . . . If you insist on strict proof (or
strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit
from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are"
[Popper, 1968, p. 50].
What can be established with logical conclusiveness is the
consistency or inconsistency of a set of propositions. Thus, for an
empirical science the relevant propositions can be sub-divided
into theoretical propositions and observational propositions in
such a way that their logical consistency or inconsistency can be
readily determined. In Popper's falsificationist philosophy of
science, a theory is considered to be "falsified" when a contradictory observation statement is accepted [1968, p. 86].
An initial problem for this sort of falsificationism, if it
claims to be both logical and empirical is that it is not possible
to deduce observational propositions from pure experience. Any
observational proposition, Popper points out,
. . .[goes] far beyond what can be known with certainty 'on the basis of immediate experience'. . . .
Every description uses universal names (or symbols,
or ideas); every statement has the character of a
Published by eGrove, 1989
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theory, of a hypothesis. The statement, 'Here is a glass
of water' cannot be verified by any observational
experience. The reason is that the universals which
appear in it cannot be correlated with any specific
sense-experience. (An 'immediate experience' is only
once 'immediately given'; it is unique.) By the word
'glass', for example, we denote physical bodies which
exhibit a certain law-like behavior, and the same
holds for the word 'water'. Universals cannot be
reduced to classes of experiences; they cannot be
'constituted' [1968, pp. 94-95].
Furthermore, any proposition which reports sensory experience must rely on some theory of perception, and of course no
theory of perception can ever be conclusively proven true because
of the problem of induction. And any observations that rely on
instruments (microscopes or telescopes, for instance) rely on
additional theories (a theory of optics). In short, there is no realm
of non-theoretical facts against which theories can be tested.
Popper's solution to these problems (and others) is to take a
methodological decision; a decision to regard the supporting
theories as "unproblematic background knowledge" — "Let h
be the hypothesis to be tested; let e be the test statement (the
evidence), and b the 'background knowledge', that is to say, all
those things which we accept (tentatively) as unproblematic
while we are testing the theory" [Popper, 1965, p. 390].
With due regard to the extent of the qualifications and
methodological decisions entailed, Popper's falsificationism can
be summarized as follows:
According to my proposal, what characterizes the
empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be
tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable
systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which
is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to
the fiercest struggle for survival [Popper, 1968, p. 42].
Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science is significantly
different from its predecessors which are often characterized as
verificationist philosophy of science. Both, however, are prescriptivist philosophies of science which perpetuate the notion
that scientific truth claims are epistemologically superior to
those of folklore, art, literature, religion, metaphysics, etc. The
epistemological virtues of science, according to both verificationists and falsificationists, rely on the notion that science is
essentially characterized by empiricism and rationality.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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The 1962 publication of Thomas Kuhn's popular and influential The Structure of Scientific Revolutions posed a challenge to
Popperian falsificationism and kicked off what has come to be
known as the 'growth of knowledge' movement in philosophy of
science. Kuhn's work seemed to 'pull the rug from under' the
claim that science is a rational enterprise. According to Kuhn,
some of the most crucial aspects of scientific advance are
determined by non-rational factors.
According to Kuhn, most scientific activity is carried out
within an accepted theoretical framework which has been built
upon past scientific achievements. The accepted theoretical
framework reflects certain beliefs about the world, and it serves
as a foundation for the articulation of problems that must be
solved if the range of explanatory power is to be extended.
Furthermore, even the methods of research that were used in the
foundational achievements tend to be accepted as the legitimate
methods, and thus perpetuated. All of this adds up to what Kuhn
characterizes as paradigm-based research. The term "paradigm", in the broad sense, "stands for the entire constellation of
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a
given community" [Kuhn, p. 175]. Paradigm-based research is
what Kuhn refers to as "normal science". It is research aimed at
the fleshing out and extension of the already accepted theoretical framework. Contradictory theories and viewpoints tend to
be suppressed by the established scientific community. Kuhn
claims that the research problems pursued tend to be those seen
as holding the most promise for such fleshing-out and extension,
and has likened the process to puzzle-solving.
In the process of carrying out normal science, scientists
inevitably encounter discrepancies between the theoretical
structure and nature. Such discrepancies can generate a crisis
and spawn competing paradigms which challenge the dominant
paradigm. Such crises and how they are resolved probably
represent the most controversial aspect of Kuhn's ideas. They
also represent the most fundamental challenge to Popper's
concern with the rational growth of scientific knowledge. While
Popper agrees that such periods exist and are, in fact, essential
to scientific progress, he believes that scientists can and do
rationally evaluate alternative paradigms. Kuhn, on the other
hand, sees such choices as essentially extra-rational or, at least,
strongly influenced by non-rational factors. He deliberately uses
"revolution" as a metaphor because of parallels he sees between
political and scientific change. He classifies as scientific revolutions, "those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which
Published by eGrove, 1989
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an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an
incompatible new one" [Kuhn, p. 92].
Kuhn maintains that scientific revolutions are important
stages in the growth of scientific knowledge that fall outside the
logically controlled processes of normal science. He refers to a
decision to adopt a new paradigm as a conversion experience
that cannot be forced by logic. Since the conversion results in (or
from?) a new way of seeing the world, Kuhn likens the process to
a visual "gestalt" switch, or to a man who has put on inverting
lenses. "Confronting the same constellation of objects as before
and knowing that he does so, he nevertheless finds them transformed through and through in many of their details" [Kuhn, p.
122].
These are the kinds of arguments that have produced
charges that Kuhn's ideas lead straight to relativism and irrationality. Kuhn also has been criticized for turning to social
psychology for enlightenment regarding scientific method. In an
attempt to maintain Kuhn's descriptive accuracy without resorting to social psychology, the late philosopher Imre Lakatos
developed the "methodology of scientific research p r o g r a m m e s "
(MSRP); a descriptive philosophy of science which does not
undermine the notion that science is thoroughly rational.
According to Lakatos, most of the significant series of
theories in the growth of scientific knowledge are welded together into research programmes by a certain continuity of
conceptual framework. Scientists working within a programme,
tend to work as if they had agreed at an early stage on a set of
methodological rules. The most basic " a g r e e m e n t " concerns the
conceptual framework that will not be subject to rejection.
Lakatos characterizes this as the " h a r d core" of the programme.
Scientists working within the programme then use their "ingenuity to articulate or even invent 'auxiliary hypotheses,' which
form a protective belt around this core. . . . It is this protective
belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests
and get adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced,
to defend the thus-hardened core" [Lakatos, p. 133].
Lakatos downplays the instances of widespread abandonment of one research programme in favor of another, the sort of
situation Kuhn describes as a religious sort of conversion.
Lakatos claims that there can be objective reasons for rejecting one programme for another: "such an objective reason is
provided by a rival research programme which explains the
previous success of its rival and supersedes it by a further
display of heuristic power" [Lakatos, p. 155].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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Another important voice in the philosophy of science debate
is that of Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend, a self-declared anarchist, has laid out an outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge in his celebrated work Against Method. He claims " t h a t
there is only one principle that can be defended under all
circumstances and in all stages of h u m a n development. It is the
principle: anything goes" [Feyerabend, p. 28]. There are always,
he claims, circumstances in which scientific progress is enhanced by disregarding, or even acting contrary to, any
methodological maxim that has ever been developed.
Feyerabend considers Lakatos to have made an ingenious
a t t e m p t at establishing methodological standards for scientific
progress, but in the final analysis he concludes "there is no
'rationally' describable difference between Lakatos and myself . . . " [Feyerabend, pp. 186-187]. He points out that Lakatos'
arguments favoring the granting of a "breathing space" for new
theories and research programmes removes most of the objections he (Feyerabend) has formerly leveled at attempts to
establish methodological standards. The main point on which
Feyerabend bases his claim of "no 'rationally' describable difference" is that Lakatos' standards do not contain any rules that
tell scientists what to do; nothing is ruled out.
Feyerabend claims that science does not deserve any special
consideration or support in a free society. Western rationality
itself, which science supposedly epitomizes, is only one tradition
among many. It provdies one way of looking at the world,
according to Feyerabend. But science, he says, has no legitimate
claim to superiority over any other sort of knowledge.
SCIENTISM AND THE "FETISH
OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH": THE REAL LEGACY
OF THE GOLDEN AGE?
Given that the 1960s was the decade when doubt and
uncertainty about the nature of scientific research dominated
discussion in philosophy of science it is indeed highly ironic that
this was also the decade that finally brought "the scientific
method" to accounting research. But the result has been more
than ironic. A good argument has been made that the dogmatic
tendencies currently being manifested in accounting research
have resulted from first equating knowledge with "scientific
knowledge," and secondly equating empirical with scientific.
In a recent Abacus article "Wisdom or Widgets", Dan
Subotnik points out that the high academic esteem for the
natural sciences, especially physics, has led to an attempt to
Published by eGrove, 1989
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emulate the methods of physics. "When [research] takes place in
disciplines outside the natural or physical sciences, but using
the same techniques, it is assumed to be an extended application
of 'scientific method' " [Subotnik, p. 96]. This, of course, is what
Chambers, Mattessich, Devine and Sterling did for accounting
— they introduced the techniques of the natural sciences.
I hasten to add that I a m not suggesting that Chambers,
Mattessich, Devine and Sterling held scientistic or dogmatic
views. Far from it. In fact, Gaffikin points out that, "Having
made his case for scientific method for research, Devine draws
attention to weaknesses in it" [1988, p. 22]. And Sterling has
argued eloquently for methodological tolerance [1971, pp. 1-6].
Subsequent researchers, however, have not followed suit; they
have tended to accept "the scientific method" as an article of
faith. The result has been aptly described as follows: "Science
has given us a h a m m e r — to borrow from an old adage — now
all our problems look like nails" [Subotnik, p. 96].
Subotnik suggests that the appeal of "the scientific method"
to the academic masses is largely due to a fear of taking
positions that are vulnerable to criticism. The avoidance of
vulnerability has become institutionalized in academia, and its
perpetuation seems to be assured by the Ph.D. dissertation
process. "We have an operating rule in academia, that in writing
a dissertation one should continuously narrow one's vision. The
common wisdom is that the supreme, if not the only, objective
in a dissertation is to make a statement that is unassailable"
[Subotnik, p. 104]. And in disciplines which have become enamored of "the scientific method" the avoidance of vulnerability has manifested itself in a penchant for " h a r d " or empirical
research. I would argue further that the penchant for empirical
research in accounting has been fed by the ready availability of
empirical data in the form of securities prices, in conjunction
with the ready availability of theories from economics and
finance (the efficient markets hypothesis and the capital assets
pricing model) which can be used to relate accounting numbers
to securities prices.
In any case, the scientific ideals introduced into accounting
by Chambers, Mattessich, Devine and Sterling in the 1960s have
been adopted by subsequent academic accountants who are less
familiar (or in many cases, totally unfamiliar) with philosophy
of science. This has resulted in accounting research that is
largely characterized by a scientistic attitude: "On the whole,
our working image of science can be reduced to a single
narrowly positivistic principle: Truth is to be found only
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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through application of empirical methods" [Subotnik, p. 97].
Subotnik suggests that we call this "the Principle of Quantitative Unassailability" [p. 97]. The Principle of Quantitative Unassailability, he claims, has tended to erase the distinctions
between academic research and factory work.
As "techniques" are increasingly refined for reducing
the "scientific method" to a guarantee of empirical
quantifiability, the pursuit of knowledge is turned into
the production of research, and knowledge itself becomes a product or commodity. Once the benefits of
the Quantitative Unassailability Principle becomes
apparent — that is, foreclosure of debate over the
importance or the integrity of the argument — it is
only a matter of time until, for similar reasons, five
articles necessarily become better than three. In other
words, researchers over time came to superimpose
another quantitative business paradigm upon their
work product — factory output [Subotnik, pp. 99-100].
In short, what started as a move toward more scientific
accounting research, has largely degenerated to scientism and
dogmatism. Many of the most prominent accounting researchers have developed an attitude that theirs is the only legitimate
form of research. Watts and Z i m m e r m a n provide the most
conspicuous case in point. In their 1986 book Positive Accounting Theory they pretentiously announce that, "Throughout this
book, we use science's concept of theory (positive theory)" [p.
338]. And they denigrate research efforts that fall outside their
own variety of economics-based empirical research (what they
call positive research). The demand for other types of accounting literature, according to them, can be thought of as "the
demand for excuses" [p. 339]. This attitude also has been
fostered by editors of some of the leading journals. For instance,
it has been reported that Nicolas Dopuch, as long-time editor of
the Journal of Accounting Research, has commented that "he
sought to kill 'the traditional form of normative theorizing' "
[Gaffikin, 1988, p. 24]. This sort of reverence for empirical
("scientific") research naturally filters down to hiring practices
in academia. Subotnik notes that, "I myself was once told at the
outset of a job interview: 'This is a statistically oriented dep a r t m e n t . We look for people who can complement [or was it
"compliment"?] our work' " [p. 102].
These scientistic tendencies in current accounting research
are certainly cause for concern. Such concern has been succinctly expressed by Stephen Zeff in his departing Accounting
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Review editorial [1983]; concern about the consequences of
narrowness and overspecialization in accounting research. He
suggests that "the 'wave of rigor' that has engulfed the accounting literature since the 1960s has led to a lesser inclination
to tackle big questions" [p. 133]. In fact, "it [often] seems that
manuscripts are the result of methods in search of questions,
rather than questions in search of methods" [p. 134]. More
specifically, Zeff is concerned that the over-emphasis on empirical research may eventually result in the complete elimination
of historical scholarship in accounting [p. 134].
There is, however, in my opinion, good basis for optimism
regarding a reversal of this scientistic trend — there is evidence
of a "reawakening" in accounting research. I am referring
primarily to the increasing stream of articles on methodology.
The last three or four years have witnessed articles tracing the
history of methodological perspectives [Gaffikin, 1987, 1988];
articles criticizing the established, or prominent, methodological views [Lehman & Tinker, 1987; Whitley, 1988; Whittington,
1987; Hines, 1988; Subotnik, 1988; Tinker, 1988]; and articles
exploring new methodological perspectives [Chua, 1986, 1986a;
Cooper & Hopper, 1987; Hopper et. al, 1987; Hopwood, 1987;
Laughlin, 1987; Lavorie, 1987; Richardson, 1987; Morgan, 1988;
Arrington & Francis, 1989]. This is a very encouraging trend.
Methodological debate is the natural enemy of the dogmatic,
scientistic attitude. Methodological debate opens up other ways
of viewing the world and knowledge of the world.
But in addition to the anti-dogmatic virtues of methodological discussion, it is especially encouraging to note that
the discussion is introducing accounting researchers to a radically different view of science than the outmoded positivistic/
empiricist conception they have received from mainstream
accounting "methodologists." Accounting researchers are being
exposed to what Richard Bernstein and other philosophers refer
to as "postempiricist philosophy and history of science" [Bernstein, p. 22].
THE POSTEMPIRICIST VIEW OF SCIENCE:
THE LEGACY OF THE GROWTH-OF-KNOWLEDGE DEBATE
Bernstein has noted that traditional empiricist philosophy
of science assumes such things as the following: experience is
objective and testable; the language of science is exact, formalizable, and literal; meanings are separate from facts; etc. [p.
32]. But largely as a result of the "growth of knowledge" debate,
the component elements of the traditional empiricist view are
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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almost universally considered to have been discredited and a
new, postempiricist view of science has emerged. From the
postempiricist perspective: scientific theories are ways of interpreting nature; facts are, to a significant degree, constituted by
theory; the language of science is inescapably metaphorical and
inexact; meanings are generated by the community of inquirers
and are understood by theoretical coherence rather than by
correspondence with facts; and so forth [Bernstein, p. 33]. The
most salient feature of postempiricist philosophy and history of
science is, according to Bernstein, its "recovery of the hermeneutical dimension of science". The hermeneutical dimension
can be explicated very succinctly with reference to the debate
over rationality.
Bernstein has noted that three books published within four
years of each other posed unique and profound implications
regarding the nature of knowledge and rationality. Kuhn's The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) was essentially concerned with natural science. It touched off a storm of controversy primarily because it was perceived as calling into question
the rationality of science. In claiming that competing paradigms
may be incommensurable, that proponents of competing paradigms are functioning in diffrent "worlds", and that the switch
from one paradigm to another is comparable to a religious
conversion or a gestalt switch, Kuhn was seen as denying the
possibility of a philosophy of science which offers explicit and
fixed criteria for decisions involving theory choice — "his critics
took him to be challenging the very rationality and objectivity of
science" [Bernstein, p. 23].
Four years earlier, Peter Winch had published The Idea of
a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958). It also
had touched off a storm of controversy. Winch was essentially
concerned with an analysis of the fundamental contrast between
the natural and the social sciences at a time when, according to
Bernstein, "The prevailing attitude . . . among professional social scientists was that their discipline was now on the secure
path of becoming a genuine natural science of individuals in
society, a natural science that differed in degree and not in kind
from the rest of the natural sciences" [pp. 26-27]. But the basic
point of congruence in the respective controversies over Winch's
book and Kuhn's book concerned the concept of rationality.
Winch had implied that different cultures may have incommensurable standards of rationality. And the implication was made
more specific in a follow-up essay: "he used the figure of speech
of 'our standards' and 'their standards' of rationality when
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speaking of modern Western society and the 'primitive' society
of the Azande" [Bernstein, pp. 27-28].
Bernstein points out that in both controversies the critics of
Kuhn and Winch tended to focus on the problem of coming up
with a universal standard of rationality. But this focus, Bernstein maintains, was off the mark. The real issue, he suggests, is
more appropriately stated as follows:
The vital issue here is really the question of what is
involved in understanding, interpreting, and explaining alien societies (and not just their rationality
or lack of rationality). How are we to do justice to the
strangeness that we discover when we encounter alien
types of activities, beliefs, rituals, institutions, and
practices, without falsifying or distorting them? [p.
28].
And this is where Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method
(originally published in German in 1960) enters the picture.
Gadamer is the central figure in the contemporary hermeneutics
movement, and hermeneutics is specifically concerned with the
processes of interpretation and understanding.
Traditional hermeneutics focuses on the processes of interpreting and understanding texts from a different time, language,
or culture. But contemporary philosophical hermeneutics as
developed by Gadamer claims a much more universal applicability. Gadamer claims that all life experiences involve the
processes of interpretation and understanding. And the relevance of Gadamer in the present discussion is that he denies the
possibility of an objective rationality that is free of historical
and cultural context, and offers a different, but non-relativistic,
notion of reason and rationality.
Understanding, according to Gadamer, grows out of "experience" and always involves a "fusion of horizons". An "experience", as Gadamer uses the term, results from an encounter
with a new situation or new development. And new situations,
he contends, are never approached with a clean slate of outlook
and expectations. We always have a perspective (a "horizon")
that has been historically shaped by culture, tradition, and
personal circumstances. And since new situations always involve an element of the unexpected, "experience" generates
what Gadamer calls "a radical negativity" (the knowledge of not
knowing) which creates an attitude of openness and allows us to
"see" possibilities that we hadn't been open to before. We are
thus changed as a result of the experience; we have a new
understanding. "The experiencer", says Gadamer, "has achttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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quired a new horizon within which something can become an
experience for h i m " [p. 317].
None of this takes place, however, without language. We are
born into a linguistic environment; an environment in which
"reality" has already been linguistically classified and ordered.
We interact via language. Our concepts are linguistically
shaped. And we think in language. As Bernstein puts it, "for
him [Gadamer] the medium of all h u m a n horizons is linguistic . . . " [p. 144]. The linguistic role is most explicit in
Gadamer's model of conversation which could be characterized
as a model for the fusion of interpersonal horizons.
For two people who do not agree on some subject and who
wish to achieve agreement, conversation holds the possibility of
the desired agreement. True conversation, however, is only
possible if both parties are willing to be open to the other's point
of view. When both parties are open in this way, then the
conversation is guided, in a sense, by the subject of the conversation. The matter under discussion, in this case, generates questions. On the other hand, if the parties are not open but only
pretend to be (as in a debating contest), then the questions they
pretend to have are false questions. Thus, according to Gadamer, " a question can be right or wrong, according as it reaches
into the sphere of the truly open or fails to do so" [p. 327].
In the case of false questions, not only do they prohibit the
issue at hand from being decided, but they stand in the way of
discovering what Gadamer refers to as " t r u t h " . Truth, in the
sense that Gadamer uses the term, refers to shared understanding and is caught up with the notion of community, as is
illustrated in the following quote:
Every conversation presupposes a common language,
or, it creates a common language. Something is
placed in the centre, as the Greeks said, which the
partners to the dialogue both share, and concerning
which they can exchange ideas with one another.
Hence agreement concerning the object, which it is
the purpose of the conversation to bring about, necessarily means that a common language must first be
worked out in the conversation. This is not an external matter of simply adjusting our tools, nor is it even
right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one
another but, rather, in the successful conversation
they both come under the influence of the truth of the
object and are thus bound to one another in a new
community [p. 341].
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Bernstein suggests that the new, postempiricist view of
science tends to incorporate a view of rationality that is very
much in tune with Gadamer's model of conversation. The
proponents of the new view deny the validity of any predetermined algorithmic scheme for evaluating hypotheses, theories,
and arguments. Instead, they tend to accept what Bernstein has
called "a dialogical model of rationality that stresses the practical, communal character of this rationality in which there is
choice, deliberation, interpretation, judicious weighing and application of 'universal criteria,' and even rational disagreement
about which criteria are relevant and most i m p o r t a n t " [p. 172].
It must be noted that Bernstein does not claim that postempiricist philosophers of science were directly borrowing from
hermeneutics. What he does maintain is that these philosophers,
via their dialectical give and take concerning the nature of
scientific inquiry, "have stressed those features of science . . .
that are hermeneutical" [Bernstein, p. 33]. Most notably with
respect to Kuhn, Bernstein suggests that he [Kuhn] was groping
toward a hermeneutical view of rationality: "It is as if he has
been searching for a proper model to express his awareness that
such deliberation and choosing [among rival paradigms] are
rational activities, but not the sort of rational activity that has
been characterized as deductive proof or empirical verification
or falsification" [p. 41].
In any case, it is obvious that the salient features of the
postempiricist view, can appropriately be characterized as
hermenueutical: the questions and problems that deserve attention emerge from social, cultural and historical circumstances;
methods of inquiry and standards of judgement are shaped by
the social practices of the community of scientists; and " t r u t h "
hinges on shared understanding.
It is also obvious that the postempiricist view of science is
radically at odds with the dominant view of science among
accounting researchers. And what is most interesting for the
present discussion is the fact that many of the (presumably
scientific) methodological views held by mainstream accounting researchers would be seen as unscientific from the postempiricist perspective. As Morgan [1988] has pointed out, "The
idea that accountants represent reality 'as is' through the means
of numbers that are objective and value free, has clouded the
much more important insight that accountants are always
engaged in interpreting a complex reality, partially, and in a
way that is heavily weighted in favour of what the accountant is
able to measure and chooses to measure . . . " [p. 480]. And as
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/3
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Hines has suggested, the erroneous and widespread identification of statistical procedures with "the scientific method" serves
to restrain criticalness and creativity in accounting research [p.
661]. Open discourse in accounting also has been restricted by
the widespread notion of a logical gulf between positive and
normative theories. "If one assumes (as many empiricists do)
that theories can be divided into 'normative' and 'positive'
frameworks, and that the verity of the latter can be established
by merely consulting factual evidence, then the scrutiny of
underlying values slips from explicit attention, returning
covertly in the disguise of 'facts' to participate in deciding what
passes as 'truth' " [Tinker, p. 183]. And making a similar point
Arrington and Francis note that, "To deny the value-ladenness
of one's theorizing is to deny responsibility for the consequences
of one's theories" [p. 4].
Finally, a historical note with respect to Devine must be
added. Although Devine was a major influence in bringing philosophy of science into accounting thought, there is evidence that
he is not particularly happy with the outcome (at least as it
currently stands). In the Preface to Volume V of his "Essays,"
Devine expresses a growing concern "over what appears to be a
new parochialism in accounting research, i.e., a tendency to
restrict research to the n a r r o w confines of q u a n t i t a t i v e
methods." And one could make a good argument that Devine's
view of science is much more in tune with the postempiricist view
than with the mainstream accounting view. In fact, Arrington's
review of the "Essays" could be construed as such an argument.
According to Arrington, Devine considered science to be essentially a way of expanding (rather than limiting or closing off) the
discourse of accounting. And there can be no doubt that Devine's
pioneering work regarding semiotics helped pave the way for the
introduction of postempiricist views into accounting literature.
Devine is fascinated with the role of language in
constructing knowledge and meaning, and draws
upon the early work in semiotics and what it might
have to say to accountants. What he could not have
foreseen is the way in which semiotics has been
expanded to the point that, currently, the history of
ideas is firmly grounded in the overriding importance
of language in the construction of meaning. Contemporary work in hermeneutics, structuralism, and
poststructuralism that is sweeping the h u m a n sciences is beginning to surface in accounting. This work
owes a debt to Devine for being the first scholar to
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position accounting firmly in the domain of language
[Arrington, 1988, p. 1391.
CONCLUSION
The juxtaposition of developments in accounting research
with developments in philosophy of science reveal that "the
Golden Age" of accounting methodology is caught up in a
compound irony; an irony that functions on more than one level.
The most basic irony is. of course, that accounting researchers
were "awakened" to the scientific method during the same
decade (the 1960s) that witnessed the disintegration of "the
received view" of scientific methodology as a result of the
"growth of knowledge" debate. The second level of irony has to
do with the respective legacies of "the Golden Age" of accounting methodology and the growth of knowledge movement in
philosophy of science. The legacy of "the Golden Age" seems to
have been the enshrinement of a dogmatic reverence for a
positivistic/empiricist research methodology and a research
environment characterized as "methods in search of questions."
The growth of knowledge movement, on the other hand, has
essentially discredited the positivistic/empiricist methodology
and cleared the way for the emergence of a hermeneuticallyinformed postempiricist view of science; a view which acknowledges the social role in the construction of "reality" and emphasizes the importance of replacing rigid pre-determined
methodological rules with the give and take of "good conversation" in the resolution of methodological issues. The ultimate
irony then is that the research methodology touted by some of
the most prominent mainstream accounting researchers must
be iudged clearly " u n s c i e n t i f i c " f r o m the postempiricist
philosophy of science perspective.
Mainstream accounting researchers would do well to ponder the advice of an outsider: "Accountants can begin making
themselves 'more scientific' by shedding their guilt for being
normative or controversial, or for having unfalsifiable theories"
[Lavoie, p. 582].
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